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Collectively the articles contained within this issue offer a lot of interesting and 
insightful material on radicalization/violence indicators and the validity of the 
TRAP-18. They do this through testing the tool against a medium-n sample of 22 
cases (Reid, Rohsi, Glaz-Ocik and Hoffman), and individual case studies ranging 
from the very famous (Breivik in Meloy, Habermey & Guldimann), to the not so 
famous (‘U’ in Bockler, Hoffman and Zick) to the barely remembered (Lucheni in 
Van Der Meer). They make important methodological contributions (discussions 
surrounding inter-coder reliability) and substantive contributions in terms of 
new data generation and providing granular level detail on a couple of largely 
overlooked and unstudied case studies. The results illustrate that time and again, 
various distal and proximal indicators built into the TRAP-18 were apparent. So, 
has the problem been solved or are there further avenues that need exploring?  
 
To my mind, the study of indicators of radicalization and terrorist intent suffers 
from eight key problems that need surmounting before we can become more 
assured in such tools. The papers within this issue offer some key clues in how 
these can be overcome and I refer to them as I work through the eight problems. 
                                                        
1 This is an amended version of a talk originally given at a conference on 
‘Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Canada, the UK and 
the US Conference’, Arlington, VA. (July, 2015).  
It is not my intention to denigrate existing approaches, but rather to try set out a 
roadmap to where we go from here.   
 
The first problem is the sheer number of supposed radicalization indicators that 
abound within the literature. At times, it seems there are more indicators than 
actual domestic terrorists. Previous work carried out on lone-actor terrorists 
identified over 100 indicators of radicalization or terrorist intent within the 
larger literature (which itself has grown since that study) (Gill et al., 2014). If 
researchers were to standardize codebooks it may lead to a crowd-sourced 
answer as to which indicators are most prevalent across a wide range of data 
collection processes and research endeavors.    
 
The second problem, which should be obvious to anyone with even minor social 
science training is that of base rates. Quite simply, we have no grasp on what the 
societal prevalence of the vast majority of radicalization indicators. In some 
cases, like issues surrounding mental disorders, it is easier because of 
epidemiological studies (see Corner, Gill and Mason, forthcoming), In other cases, 
like leakage, this is a really difficult task to quantify. Without a sense of base rate, 
we can’t measure with any certainty how reliable any one indicator is, either in 
isolation or in combination with other indicators. Instead, we can only sample on 
the dependent variable which is not great practice. Criminology largely 
overcame such problems through longitudinal cohort studies and trace aspects 
related to the individual’s development from an early age, personality factors, 
their interactions with the criminal justice system and so on.  These are 
obviously long-term projects that do not suit the immediacy of the problem of 
radicalization but their potential benefits to the literature are incalculable.  
 
On a related note, the study of radicalization indicators is often misunderstood 
as ultimately producing predictive utility. This is not the case and is neatly 
outlined by Meloy et al. in this issue: “it will never be a predictive measure of 
targeted violence risk due to the very low base rate for such behaviors, even in a 
population of concern”. Instead, these studies are meant as a tool to help triage 
amongst a number of cases displaying worrying signs. Not every lead or every 
case can be assigned full priority, so these measures, tools and protocols are 
developed with the intention of assigning low-, medium- or high-risk to the 
cases/leads based on our experience of previous cases. They are not meant to 
look at a random sample of the population and pick out specific individuals but 
rather to help triage between a sample of people who have already been deemed 
by someone else (be it an intelligence analyst, a member of a partner agency like 
mental health or a member of the public) as being a risk to society.  
 
The third problem is related; our lack of understanding around protective 
factors. Simply, we just do not account for them. We only look for ‘risk factors’ 
which may lead to a series of confirmation biases amongst intelligence analysts. 
Protective factors may come in many forms and include individual factors (e.g. 
attitudes, academic achievement, social orientation, self-control, personality 
factors), peer factors (e.g. close relationships with non-criminal peers, pro-social 
norms within peer group, number of affective relationships), family factors (e.g. 
highly connected to family, involvement in social activities).  
One related concept might be that of opportunity. Two of the case studies in this 
issue highlight the key role of opportunity in moderating action. For example, in 
the German case study, ‘U’ works at an airport frequented regularly by travelling 
U.S. army personnel. ‘U’ therefore had access to this particular target group on a 
regular basis and the capability to attack them through access to firearms via his 
brother and also because presumably airport staff do not go through the same 
rigorous screening process at airports that travellers go through. Without any of 
these factors (e.g. access to potential victims, access to firearms, capability of 
getting firearm to where the potential victims frequented), it is unlikely the 
attack would occur. It seems ‘U’s grievance was directly related to the actions of 
U.S. army personnel (see the section on the videos he consumed and what he 
thought he overhead U.S. army personnel talking to each other about), so 
displacement of his attack to the ‘West’ in general, may seem less likely in the 
case he couldn’t attack U.S. army personnel. The Lucheni case study, outlined by 
van der Meer (this issue), also implicitly highlights the importance of 
opportunity. Lucheni held a grievance against royalty in general and held no 
deep conviction about who in particular should be targeted. He initially zoned in 
on the Duke of Orleans and the Italian King. The former cancelled his visit to 
Geneva (where Lucheni resided). The latter was located too far away. It appears 
that Lucheni only turned his attention toward his victim, the Empress of Austria, 
the day before the attack when he learnt, via a newspaper, that she was staying 
in a hotel in the town he lived. Not only was she geographically accessible, but 
she was also quite idiosyncratic in her loose security regime and disregard for 
close protection (as detailed in the case study) providing further opportunity for 
action.  
 Not every lone actor will be as meticulous or willing to change plans irrespective 
of opportunity like Anders Breivik (see the Meloy, Habermey & Guldimann  case 
study, this issue). Some will be fixated on one key attack, largely facilitated by 
access to an opportunity. If the opportunity goes away, so too may their intent to 
attack. Intelligence agencies with access to cases where persons of interest 
developed a plan, were disrupted, and later abandoned their intent should re-
examine those cases to see what was different about these individuals compared 
to those who bounce from Plan A to Plan B to Plan C and so on as highlighted by 
Gill (2015).  
 
The fourth problem is that of weighting. In most studies of radicalization 
indicators, all indicators are treated equally. For example, the Safire Project 
(http://www.safire-project-results.eu/documents/focus/8.pdf) outlines 21 
indicators, ranging from “lingering concerns with questions of meaning and 
identity” to “dependence on communication technology” to “associating with 
extremist groups” and “training travel”. The first two indicators are clearly very 
different in scope, nature and threat than the latter two yet they appear 
weighted equally within their toolkit. One of the particular innovations within 
the TRAP-18 is that it splits these indicators into two categories – distal and 
proximal – and outlines how their relative presence should inform different 
responses. “The presence of distal characteristics of the TRAP should bring 
attention to a subject for monitoring. The presence of warning behaviors should 
focus the work on active risk management” (Meloy et al). Bockler, Hoffman and 
Zick (this issue) go a step further, and state that the presence of one proximal 
indicators necessitates instant. This is an interesting, logical and yet rarely made 
argument. Of course, in reality not all indicators are equal. A part of the problem 
is that the study of indicators is almost trying to do too much – from highlighting 
indicators of someone adopting an extremist ideology to highlighting indicators 
of someone planning an attack. These are very different processes, underpinned 
by very different behaviours and necessitating intervention by very different 
parts of the policing/intelligence/partner agency framework. The radicalization 
literature is nowhere near specific enough in terms of what it is studying the 
indicators of. It can learn much from contemporary threat management 
literature.  
 
 
The fifth problem is related to behavior clustering. Bockler, Hoffman and Zick’s 
case study of the Frankfurt Airport Attack is a great example of how risk 
crystalises. There is no silver bullet indicator. Instead, it is a story of how the 
experience of one risk factor led to the experience of another risk factor and so 
on. Each acted as a force multiplier upon each other and led the individual to the 
point of engaging in a terrorist act. Whilst the four papers in this issue make an 
excellent job of outlining the prevalence of the different 18 factors, it might now 
be time to look at which factors are (a) more likely to co-occur together and (b) 
whether some of these factors act as substitutes for each other rather than co-
occur together. Various forms of multi-dimensional scaling and cluster analyses 
will help bring the analysis from the descriptive, to the inferential and mirror 
paradigm shifts witnessed in the study of other offenders like arsonists (REF).  
 
 The sixth problem is related to aggregated understandings of the ‘terrorist’. 
There has been some recent improvements in the academic literature here. Sub-
set comparisons are now much more common. For example, Merari (2010) 
found suicide bombers to display symptoms of depression more often than 
suicide bomber organizers. Gruenewald et al. (2013) illustrated that extreme 
right-wing lone actors more likely display mental disorders than extreme right-
wing group actors. Gill et al.’s (2014) sample of extreme right-wing lone actors 
were significantly less educated, less likely to conduct dry-runs and less likely to 
leak aspects of intent than their al-Qaeda-inspired lone actor counterparts. 
Finally, Corner and Gill (2015) found lone actors with mental health disorders 
were significantly more likely to experience recent stressors than those lone 
actors without mental health problems. LaFree (2013) refers to sub-set 
comparisons as the “third and final development on the road to the empirical 
study of terrorist attacks”. He may be optimistic in calling it the “final” 
development however given the range of concerns outlined in this paper. 
 
The seventh problem relates to sequencing these behaviors. Case studies are a 
particularly fruitful tool in this regard but perhaps lack the generalizability of 
other approaches. Quantifying these sequences is possible.  By sequencing the 
behaviours we might get a sense of how long it takes to move through the gears 
from adopting a radical ideology toward attack planning and ultimately carrying 
out the attack. We get some good insight from isolated case studies. Bockler et al. 
note that case study’s “help us understand both the unique characteristics and 
commonly shared attributes of those who are ideologically motivated to commit 
violence toward noncombatants. They often allow for a deep dive into the distal 
and proximal variables which contributed to the targeted violence.” For example, 
this issue’s German case study notes: “we observed only a very brief and 
accelerated pathway towards the violent act. This represents an important 
change in the demands placed upon threat assessors.” They continue: “the actual 
pathway to violence, primed by his immersion in Salafist ideology, did not unfold 
over the course of weeks or months, but in a day or two. This represents an 
important change in the demands placed upon threat assessors: there is much 
less time to find and then interdict along the late stages of the pathway 
(planning, preparation, implementation), in contrast to the relatively slower 
proximal behaviors of fixation on a cause and identification as a “soldier” for the 
cause, which still appear to take months, if not years, to fully develop.” 
 
The recent case of Brustholm Ziamani appears just as quick. Three months prior 
to stepping out his door with a backpack filled with an ISIS flag, a hammer and a 
long knife, Ziamani was a Jehovah’s Witness. In the space of three months, he 
converted, adopted a radical interpretation of Islam, decided to act, built the 
capability and came very close to carrying out an attack. The Breivik case study, 
on the other hand, appears to be a much slower pathway toward violent action 
(largely moderated by the technical sophistication needed to acquire and 
synthesize the materials for the bombing component of his plot). More analyses 
need to be conducted to illustrate whether one of these is the norm, the other the 
outlier or whether there is a recognizable number of trajectories into action (and 
whether these are moderated by attack type).  
 
The final problem relates to taking time into account in a very different way. 
Methodologically speaking, the study of lone-actor terrorists and other such low 
base rate offenders are heavily informed by risk and threat assessment research 
on high-volume offenders. The latter typically use samples of offenders highly 
clustered in time. These approaches can pinpoint applicable risk factors to that 
particular cohort at that particular temporal period. Generalizability comes from 
replication studies utilizing different spatial and/or temporal cohorts that weed 
out non-replicated risk factors. However, the study of low base-rate offences 
does not have this assurance mechanism built in simply because they have such 
a low base-rate (see Gill et al., Under Review for further discussion). For 
example, in this issue Reid, Roshdi, Glaz-Ocik and Hoffman examine 22 offenders 
over a 36-year time period. This is quite typical within the wider research 
literature with studies having a offender-to-year ratio between 0.60 to 4.44 
(Hempel, Meloy and Richards, 1999; Gill, 2015). Whilst these descriptive studies 
highlight risk factors, we largely overlook whether these findings are driven by 
temporal-cohorts or are uniformly distributed within the observational pool. By 
temporally analyzes the data, it may indicate that the behaviour’s prevalence is 
actually decreasing (or increasing) over time. This has large implications for 
threat assessment and threat management protocols.  
 
In a very short space of time, the empirical study of terrorist behavior has made 
some large steps with multiple data-driven, methodologically-rich projects 
producing a lot of insight. The literature is finally at a point where data access is 
not so much of a problem as it was previously. The next big challenges are 
essentially conceptual and hopefully this commentary can work towards 
synthesizing and standardizing approaches across these multiple data-driven 
endeavors. To progress, we need think more carefully about base rates, 
protective factors, weighting/clustering risk factors, thinking about the 
‘terrorist’ in a more nuanced way and take temporality into account.  
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